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Renaud Thillaye analyses how British MEPs voted during the 2009-14 European Parliament. He finds that
each of the four parties (Conservatives, LibDems, Labour and UKIP) had a distinctive attitude in the
European Parliament and varying degrees of success. The LibDems are reliable partners, Labour’s
attitude has been more intricate and ambiguous, the Conservatives can be seen as reluctant, and
UKIP, unsurprisingly, stands out as ‘dismissive’. The analysis confirms the difficulty for political
parties of reconciling engagement at EU level and domestic politics.
Unsurprisingly, the European elections campaign in the UK has so far been dominated by the in-out
question. The Clegg-Farage debates may have helped dramatizing the strategic choice faced by
Britain in the years to come, but it is doubtful that voters understand now better what the European Parliament
decides on and how the UK parties fare in Brussels. This is worrying when, according to the Eurobarometer, 23% of
Britons have never heard of the European Parliament and Euroabstainers are set to be the real winners of the
upcoming euro-elections.
In a Policy Network contribution to a cross-European project led by Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute and
VoteWatch Europe, I have analysed how British MEPs from the four main political parties (Conservatives, LibDems,
Labour, UKIP) have voted during the current (2009-2014) parliament. The analysis screens through 18 votes
touching on 15 important or particularly controversial issues such as trade agreements, the EU budget, economic
governance in the Eurozone, the Single Market’s regulation and the European Parliament’s seat.
The overall picture of the British presence in the European Parliament is well known. As the table below shows, the
LibDems and Labour are well integrated in so far as they are members of groups which are very often parts of
‘winning coalitions’. Their loyalty rate to their group is pretty high, thus showing that LibDem and Labour MEPs
accept the logic of collective discipline. This contrasts with the Conservatives and UKIP, both of whom belong to
much less successful groups, and UKIP’s loyalty rate is very low.
Political groups in the EP (number of MEPs) Participation
rate in a
winning
coalition*
Internal
cohesion
rate*
Main affiliated
British political
parties (number of
MEPs)
Loyalty
rate to
group*
European People’s Party (274) 89% 92.5%
Socialists and Democrats (194) 84% 91.5% Labour Party (13) 89%
Liberals and Democrats (85) 87% 88.5% Liberal Democrats
(14)
96%
Greens (58) 67% 94.5% Green Party (2)SNP
(2)
99%85%
European Conservative and Reformists (57) 56% 86.5% Conservatives (23) 97.5%
European United Left (35) 52% 79.5% Sinn Fein (1) 85%
Europe of freedom and democracy (31) 53% 48.5% UKIP (10 – down
from 13 in 2009)
52.5%
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*between 14.07.2009 – 17.04.2014 Source: http://www.votewatch.eu
It matters however to look at what actually lies behind these aggregate figures: on which issues did UK parties follow
the left-right logic of EU political groups? On which occasion did they ‘rebel’ against their own groups and vote along
seemingly national lines? What does it mean for the LibDems, Labour, Conservatives and UKIP to defend the British
interest in the European Parliament? My analysis suggests that each of the four parties has a distinctive attitude in
the European Parliament.
The Liberal Democrats can be seen as successful and ‘reliable’ Europeans. Of 15 cases, British LibDems were on
the winning side 12 times, always alongside their group. This does not mean, however, that they compromise with
sister parties to the point of forgetting to defend British interests. They backed the 2014-2020 Multiannual Financial
Framework (MFF) in November 2013 contrary to a minority of ALDE members that opposed the overall reduction in
EU spending. They were also part of the coalition that blocked, in October 2010, the extension of the minimum full-
paid maternity leave from 14 to 20 weeks.
Furthermore, the LibDems , along with their group and other British MEPs, lost when they rejected the launch of an
enhanced cooperation on the financial transaction taxes (FTT) in May 2012. They ‘rebelled’ only once against the
ALDE by standing behind the idea of phasing out from nuclear energy, an issue over which they are very close to
Continental green parties.
By comparison, Labour’s attitude comes across as more intricate and ambiguous. Labour MEPs can certainly claim
to be successful players when voting in the same way as their S&D partners. This happened in 10 out of 15 cases.
Perhaps the most compelling victory for Labour MEPs was to have the upper hand over a significant minority of
S&D MEPs regarding the opening of free-trade negotiations with the US (TTIP).
The Labour delegation, nevertheless, tends to rebel against their own group more than the LibDems do, a choice
that put them in the losing camp in 4 cases. This happened on issues that have a strong national dimension, such
as the FTT, the CAP budget, and a proposal to increase the EU’s ‘own resources’. More surprisingly was the
rejection, by 7 Labour MEPs (against 3 yes-votes) of the extension of the minimum period of maternity leave. This
was a classical left-right issue, whereby most centre-left MEPs saw an opportunity to make social standards
converge across Europe. Yet a majority of Labour MEPs sided with their German SPD colleagues, probably wary of
over-regulation burdening businesses (especially SMEs) further.
The position of the Conservatives is more comfortable in the sense that they decided to cut off from the EPP’s group
constraints in 2009 and went their own way to found the European Conservatives and Reformist Group. Looking at
the Tories’ voting records since 2009, this move seems to reflect real divergences. 8 votes were won with the EPP
group, mostly on consensual issues such as TTIP, the deepening of the internal market for services, the MFF, and
the creation of the European External Action Service.
However, when they did not join the majority formed around EPP MEPs, UK Conservatives and UKIP MEPs found
themselves on the same losers’ benches five times. On climate change, for instance, they rejected in July 2013 the
proposal to ‘backload’ CO2 auctions, a solution to the problem of persistently low prices on the EU’s carbon market.
In fairness, 169 EPP MEPs did the same. However, after pulling out of the centre-right group, Tories may find it more
difficult to win a greater number of MEPs over their pro-market and soft-regulation line.
UKIP, finally, stands out as a ‘dismissive’ player in the European Parliament. For the votes examined in the study,
their non-voting rate tops 55%. Detachment is also manifest through the low level of EFD cohesiveness, a fact that
testifies for UKIP’s unwillingness to lead their group and embrace the logic of coalition-building.
UKIP MEPs voted ‘No’ 16 times in 18 the votes studied. The only occasion when they put their thumb up was in
November 2013 to support the idea of a ‘roadmap to a single seat’ for the EP ‘in order to create long term savings in
the EU budget’. UKIP was partly absent when it could have joined forces with other British MEPs to block texts
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perceived as going against the national interest such as the FTT enhanced cooperation, and the increase in the
EU’s own resources. It also rejected measures considered as ‘British victories’, such as the launch of TTIP talks and
the 2014-2020 MFF.
If anything, this analysis confirms the difficulty, for political parties, of reconciling engagement at EU level and
domestic politics. UKIP’s dismissive stance and the LibDems’ EU-friendly attitude might be seen as two extremes,
but the mixed fortunes of Labour and the Conservatives says a lot about the fact that there is no gain without pain in
EU politics.
Perhaps Labour’s caution and ambivalence towards its partners is what the UK has best to offer at the moment.
Indeed, Labour needs to be seen both as a reliable partner in Brussels and tough on the EU in London. It must be
critical in a constructive way while avoiding putting EU membership into question. Continental partners must
understand in this light the reluctance to endorse Martin Schulz as the Socialist candidate for the post of European
Commission president.
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog, nor of the
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